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Abstract. The control stations of many unmanned systems have been characterized by less-
than-adequate human-system interfaces. Some of the interface problems may have been 
prevented had an existing regulation or cockpit design principle been applied. In other cases, 
the design problems may indicate a lack of suitable guidance material. 
The human factors of unmanned operations will be reviewed, and a NASA program to 
develop human-factor guidelines for control stations will be described. To be effective, 
guidelines must be relevant to a wide range of systems, must not be overly prescriptive, and 
must not impose premature standardization on evolving technologies. Several types of 
guidelines are described. These relate to required capabilities, information requirements, 
properties of the human machine interface, and general cognitive engineering principles. 
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Introduction  
 
The civilian use of remotely piloted, or “unmanned” aircraft is likely to increase 
rapidly in the years ahead. Despite being referred to as “unmanned” some of the major 
challenges confronting this emerging sector relate to human factors. As unmanned aircraft 
systems (UAS) are introduced into civil airspace, a failure to adequately consider human 
factors could result in preventable accidents that may not only result in loss of life, but may 
also undermine public confidence in remotely piloted operations. 
 
Many of the human factors principles for cockpit design, particularly in the first half of 
the 20th century, were identified through the investigation of accidents and incidents – an 
approach sometimes referred to as “tombstone safety”.  Community expectations of safety 
and reliability have increased markedly since the early years of aviation, and it is no longer 
considered acceptable to field an immature system, and then rely on subsequent accidents and 
incidents to identify design deficiencies. For this reason, it is crucial that human factors 
design principles for UAS be identified as early as possible. 
 
Ground control stations (GCS) of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) range from 
commercial off-the-shelf laptops, to sophisticated purpose-built interfaces housed in shelter 
trailers or control facilities (see figure 1). Although some GCS possess aviation interfaces 
(such as sidestick controllers), most  also include interfaces based on consumer electronic 
devices such as screen-based displays, pull-down menus, and “point-and-click” input devices 
(Scheff, 2012; Waraich, Mazzuchi, Sarkani & Rico, 2013). Widespread problems have been 
identified with control station interfaces, including error-provoking control placement, non-
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intuitive automation interfaces, an over-reliance on text displays, and complicated sequences 
of menu selection to perform minor or routine tasks (Cooke, Pringle, Pedersen & Connor, 
2006).  In some cases, the interface problem may have been prevented had an existing 
regulation or cockpit design principle been applied. In other cases, the design problems reflect 
emerging issues that are not covered by existing regulatory or advisory material.    
 
 
As UAS are introduced to non-segregated airspace, a failure to adequately consider the 
human factors of unmanned aviation could result in easily preventable accidents that may 
undermine public confidence in this emerging sector.  Critical human issues include the 
necessary crew qualifications to operate a UAS in non-segregated airspace, operational 
requirements, flight procedures, and safety management systems. This paper is focused on the 
design of the GCS.  Some aspects of unmanned aviation with implications for its design 
include the following: 
 
Reduced sensory cues – The rich sensory cues available to the pilot of a conventional 
aircraft include visual, auditory, proprioceptive and olfactory sensations. The absence of these 
cues in a UAS makes it more difficult for the pilot to maintain an awareness of the aircraft’s 
state (Williams, 2008).  Video imagery has been proposed as a partial solution, however video 
downlinks can impose significant bandwidth requirements (International Telecommunications 
Union, 2010) making them impractical in some situations. 
 
Handovers between control stations – Control of an unmanned aircraft may be handed 
over in-flight between pilots at the same control station console, between consoles at the same 
control station, or between physically separated control stations (Williams, 2006). The control 
station and procedures must be designed to facilitate the required handovers. Where the 
unmanned aircraft is designed to remain aloft for an extended period, multiple crew 
handovers may occur during the course of a single flight (Tvaryanas, 2006). 
 
Air traffic management issues -  NASA simulations are examining the interactions 
between UAS pilots and Air Traffic Control (ATC). This work has examined the ability of the 
UAS pilot to comply with ATC instructions in an efficient and timely manner (Fern, Shively 
& Johnson, 2012) and the impact of UAS non-normal situations on ATC operations (Fern, 
Rorie & Shively, 2012). Simulations are also examining display and information requirements 
to enable UAS pilots to detect and avoid other aircraft in the absence of an “out the window” 
view (Fern, 2012). The results of the NASA simulation studies will inform the development 
of GCS guidelines. 
 
Figure 1. Ground control station for the 7 kg MLB Bat (left), and the 14600 kg Global Hawk. 
Latencies – Control links may introduce a delay between pilot input, response 
execution, and display of the response. These delays, ranging from hundreds of milliseconds 
to several seconds, will be most problematic when a system is under direct manual control, 
and less so when a system is under the control of automation (Mouloua, Gilson, Daskarolis-
Kring, Kring & Hancock, 2001). Delays in voice communication may also occur in some 
circumstances.  Latencies of around 750 milliseconds have been shown to disrupt ATC/pilot 
communications (Sollenberger, McAnulty & Kerns, 2003). 
 
Flight termination considerations – In an emergency, the pilot of an unmanned aircraft 
may be required to destroy the aircraft by a controlled impact, ditching, or other flight 
termination method.  Although no lives are at stake on board the aircraft, the pilot is still 
responsible for the protection of life and property on the ground. The information pilots will 
require to make this difficult decision and execute the action is yet to be determined. The risk 
of inadvertent activation of the flight termination system must also be considered (Hobbs, 
2010).     
 
Management of the data link and the potential for loss of link – The UAS 
communication and control link can be broken down into four basic elements. (1) The 
telecommand or uplink, (2) The telemetry or downlink, (3) Communication links, and (4) 
Payload links. Links may utilize terrestrial radio or satellite communications. As well as 
flying the aircraft, the pilot must also “fly the link”. This requires the pilot to maintain an 
awareness of the strength of the control link, link latencies, factors that may eliminate or 
reduce the strength of the link, and manage situations in which the link is lost.  No control 
link can be guaranteed to be 100% reliable, and systems must be designed to tolerate 
contingencies in which the pilot may be out of the control loop due to an abnormal or 
undesired event, such as a loss of control link. 
 
Workload management – A challenge for the designer of the ground control station is 
to maintain pilot engagement during extended periods of low workload, particularly when the 
pilot’s role is to perform supervisory control of automation (Cummings, Mastracchio, 
Thornburg, Mkrtchyan, 2013). In addition, the pilot must be prepared for the possibility that 
workload may increase rapidly.   
 
Guidelines for the ground control station 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has recognised that 
human factors guidelines for the GCS will be a key requirement for safe and reliable 
operation of civilian UAS. The agency is working with key stakeholders to develop 
recommendations for GCS human factor guidelines with a focus on unmanned aircraft 
operating beyond visual line-of-sight. The focus will be the control station, and its immediate 
environment. Where appropriate, issues such as maintenance or ground support will also be 
considered. Personnel training, crew qualifications, procedure design and physical security of 
the GCS are critical issues deserving of specific attention, but are outside the scope of this 
work, except as they relate to the design of the human-machine interface (HMI) or the work 
environment.  
 
In compiling guidelines for the GCS for UAS operating in civilian airspace, NASA is 
building upon the existing material on GCS human factors (Berson, Gershzohn, Wolf, 
Schultz, 2005, ICAO, 2011, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 2012; NATO, 2004, 
2007, 2009) and human factors material with relevance to HMI design from FAA, EASA, and 
industry human factor standards.  
 
In contrast to regulations, guidelines are not mandatory requirements, however, by 
encapsulating solutions to identified problems or areas of risk, guidelines can assist system 
developers, particularly those lacking extensive experience in aerospace.  User communities 
benefit from greater standardization, improved reliability and safety due to a reduction in 
design-induced errors, and may use guidelines to evaluate systems prior to acquisition. Lastly, 
regulatory agencies may draw on guidelines when developing regulations or advisory 
material. Regardless of the area of technology in question or the form of the guideline, useful 
guidelines possess the following characteristics: 
 
• Evidence-based. Guidelines should be linked to areas of need identified from 
operational experience, simulations or analysis. 
• Organized. Guidelines should be organized hierarchically, with general statements 
preceding specific statements. 
• Not overly prescriptive. Overly prescriptive statements should be avoided as they may 
constrain innovation. In the case of immature or evolving technologies, guidelines 
must be developed with the awareness that prematurely developed guidelines may not 
reflect the characteristics of the technology once it matures. 
• Applicable to diverse systems. Guidelines must be compatible with a wide range of 
technological solutions and capabilities. Some guidelines will have general 
applicability across platforms and capabilities, while others will address issues unique 
to particular technologies.     
• Consistent. As well as being internally consistent, guidelines should not conflict with 
regulations and other mandatory requirements. 
• Achievable. Achieving the intent of the guideline should be within current technical 
capabilities. 
• Assessable. It should be possible to evaluate whether the intent of a particular 
guideline has been met. 
 
Several types of human factor guidelines can be identified. These include statements 
of capabilities, statements of information requirements, and properties of the human machine 
interface, broad cognitive engineering principles, and human factors engineering processes. 
These are described below. 
 
Statements of capabilities - Certain guidelines take the form of statements of desired 
capabilities, such as descriptions of tasks that the pilot is expected to be able to perform via 
the interface. Examples include voice communication with ATC, and the ability to direct the 
aircraft on to a magnetic heading when instructed by ATC.  In general, capability statements 
will not define how the task will be performed, although a desired level of accuracy or speed 
may be specified.  Some functions that must be performed by a human will have universal 
relevance to all UAS operations in civil airspace, for example, voice communication with Air 
Traffic Control. In other cases, the need for a specific human task demand will depend on 
system design choices, and whether a function is assigned to a machine or to a human.  
 
Information statements  - These guidelines deal with the information that the interface 
is expected to provide to the pilot, or inputs that the human is expected to make to the system 
via controls. These guidelines will typically be expressed in general terms, leaving the HMI 
designer free to create an interface that meets the intent of the guideline. For example it may 
be stated that the pilot should receive an alert if communication with the air vehicle is lost, 
without defining the form that this alert should take.  
 
Properties of the human-machine interface (HMI) - The properties of an interface can 
be specified at either a physical level (its physical form or appearance) or at a functional level 
(how it should work). Physical properties include layout, shape, visibility, color, hard vs soft 
controls or displays, and menu structure. Functional properties may include features to 
prevent, detect and recover from predictable pilot errors, prioritization and context sensitivity 
of information, minimization of clutter & nuisance alerts.  
 
General cognitive engineering principles -  At the broadest level are statements of 
design philosophy that are agnostic with respect to the form of the interface. Some broad 
principles relate to the overall functioning of the GCS, in particular properties or 
characteristics that emerge from the operation of all sub-systems together. Examples are the 
general design principles for human-system interfaces proposed by Norman (1988) and 
Shneiderman and Plaisant (2005). These deal with issues such as the internal consistency of 
the interface, the need for feedback on control inputs, and features to prevent, detect and 
recover from anticipated operator errors.  Endsley and Jones (2012) propose a set of 50 design 
principles intended to maximize situational awareness. Draft NATO guidelines on UAS 
human machine interface refer to the need to consider cognitive engineering issues including 
feedback, mental workload, consistency, minimization of memory load, consistency, and 
accommodation of individual differences (NATO, 2007).  
 
Recommended human factors engineering processes  - In addition to design guidelines 
that relate to the characteristics of the HMI, it is also useful to specify guidelines that relate to 
the processes used to develop the HMI. Human factors engineering processes occur during the 
design and development phase of a technological system to ensure that it will operate safely 
and effectively, and will be consistent with the capabilities and limitations of the human 
operator (O'Hara, Higgins, Persensky, Lewis & Bongarra, 2004). Process-related guidelines 
are critical because even the most comprehensive design guidelines cannot capture every 
potential HMI issue. Process-related guidelines have the potential to uncover and address 
previously unrecognized issues during the development phase of the HMI. Human 
engineering processes include the use of mock-ups and simulations, task analysis, and human 
failure modes and effects analysis (HFMEA). 
 
The guidelines development process 
 
The development of human factors guidelines begins by defining the role of the human 
in the system. A description of the roles and responsibilities of the human can then enable 
areas where guidelines are needed to be identified. Existing guidelines or standards can then 
be identified and adapted, and new guidelines can be created where necessary.  
 
The first step in the guidelines development process is the identification of key tasks 
and functions assigned to the pilot. The uncertainties of functional allocation between the 
human and the machine can present a potential problem at this stage, however this uncertainty 
is greatly reduced once some basic assumptions are made concerning the role of the human in 
the system. The FAA (2013) roadmap for the integration of UAS contains a set of 14 
assumptions concerning the operation beyond visual line-of-sight of UAS. Despite the 
diversity of unmanned systems, varying levels of automation, and different operating 
environments, the FAA assumptions imply a minimum set of generic pilot tasks and functions 
that will be applicable regardless of the characteristics or capabilities of the specific UAS. 
Among the fundamental assumptions are the following: 
 
a) Each UAS will have a pilot in command,  
b) Flight will be in compliance with existing rules and procedures,  
c) Operations will not be autonomous under normal conditions,  
d) The pilot will have the ability to assume control at all times during normal operations.  
 
Working with members of the human factors team of RTCA SC-203 a generic list of 
UAS pilot tasks based on existing descriptions of tasks for UAS and manned aircraft was 
developed. The task list is being supplemented with information from NASA’s UAS 
simulation work, a NASA-sponsored review of UAS pilot information requirements, UAS 
accident and incident reports, human factors literature, and input from UAS pilots.   
 
A pilot-centred model of the UAS can be used to organize and present the set of pilot 
tasks. The model presented in Figure 2 shows the pilot as a central element of the UAS, 
interacting with other system elements via the GCS. The nature of the interactions will change 
according to several conditions, including the stage of flight, airspace involved, level of 
automation involved, and the presence of contingencies such as lost link. At a fundamental 
level, pilot interactions involve the receipt of information from displays, pilot information 
processing and control inputs made via the GCS. Additionally, the pilot communicates with 
air traffic control, other airspace users, the support segment, and ancillary services such as 
weather briefers. 
  
 
 
Figure 3 presents a system-level breakdown of UAS pilot tasks. This model provides 
an overview of the role of the pilot and can act as a checklist to ensure that all areas of 
Figure 2. Proposed pilot-centred model of a UAS 
human-system interaction are considered when developing guidelines for the human interface. 
The “Manage” category includes the overall planning, decision-making, and management 
functions that must be accomplished by the pilot, supported by the human-machine interface. 
For ease of presentation, these tasks are shown as separate in figure 3, although they overlap 
and cut-across other tasks.    
 
	  
Figure 3. A model of UAS pilot tasks 
 
Each pilot task can be analysed according to the information requirements necessary to 
perform it and the control inputs that the pilot will be required to make. Desired properties of 
the human machine interface can then be considered, along with general cognitive 
engineering principles.  For example, the broad task “Monitor and control status of links” 
might be decomposed into subtasks including “Select communication mode”, “Confirm that 
communication link is established with correct aircraft” and “Maintain awareness of link 
strength & quality”.  Each of these sub-tasks will in turn be associated with information and 
control requirements. For example, the pilot may require displays showing link strength, and 
the geographical limits of link coverage.  The desired properties of these displays can then be 
considered. This could include whether link strength be communicated using textual, 
graphical or aural cues, and when the pilot should be warned of an impending loss of link.   
 
It is not considered necessary to develop guidelines for every identified pilot task. 
Instead, areas where guidelines will be useful are being identified on the basis of criticality. 
These are areas where consequential errors could occur, or pilot functions that have been 
identified as worthy of attention based on simulations, operational experience, or the 
judgment of subject matter experts.  
 
Each identified topic area will be reviewed against existing regulatory material and 
associated advisory material. If a regulation adequately deals with the topic, the material will 
be referenced and there will be no need to create new guidance. If regulatory material does 
not cover a particular topic, existing UAS standards will be reviewed to identify a guideline 
that covers the issue. If no suitable guideline is found, the next step will be to identify a 
general human factors standard that deals with the issue. Finally, original guidelines will be 
written.  
 
Conclusions  
 
A set of human factors guidelines for the GCS is needed to ensure that UAS can be 
operated safely and efficiently. Human factors guidelines for the cockpits of conventionally 
piloted aircraft were developed over many years, often in response to accidents and incidents. 
This method of development is no longer acceptable. Therefore it is important to identify the 
necessary principles as early as possible based on the results of simulations, early operational 
experience, and lessons learned from other application of teleoperation and related 
technologies. 
 
Given that access to civilian airspace will require a human pilot to be responsible for 
each UAS, it is possible to broadly identify many of the tasks and functions that must be 
performed by the pilot. This in turn, enables the identification of areas where human factor 
guidelines may be of assistance. Guidelines, by their nature, are not regulations or mandatory 
statements, however we believe that they will be of value to all those involved in the 
integration of UAS.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that guidelines must be updated as new information comes 
to light. While the development of control stations will be informed by guidelines, the 
guidelines will in turn be informed by the experience gained from UAS operations. 
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